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International Environmental Law
and the "Bottom-Up" Approach:
A Review of the Desertification Convention
KYLE W. DANISH*
The media was once filled with images of encroaching deserts and
starving populations. Attention has since shifted to other issues, but
the problems remain. Desertification is acute not only in familiar
desert regions such as the Sahara, but in regions such as the Sahelian
and Other drylands which comprise nearly thirty-five percent of the
earth's total land area. Mr. Danish analyzes the Desertification
Convention of 1995, discussing both the Convention's efforts to
address the environmental degradation and the Convention's impact
on international notions of the state, crafting large-scale responses,
and generating centralized regulation. This Convention employs a
"bottom-up" approach; it focuses on local developmental issues and
the marginalized peoples living in the threatened areas. It provides
increased international recognition for non-governmental
organizations and local land users by obligating states to channel
authority and resources to them. The article presents an overview of
the Convention and analysis based on international environemental
legal norms. The author illustrates that, despite donor fatigue and
reticence on the part of developed nations, the "bottom-up" approach
in conjunction with creative financing methods will provide a more
effective means for dealing with a growing environmental crisis.
* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Temple University School of Law; M.P.A. Candidate, 1996, Princeton
University Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs; B.A., Haverford College, 1989.
The author acknowledges the invaluable guidance of Jeffrey Dunoff and the helpful comments of Marc Levy
and Henry Richardson.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In April 1995, delegates from 103 nations signed an agreement initiating
a new international effort to address the worldwide environmental problem of
desertification.' The document they signed, the Desertification Convention,
is not only a major advance in efforts to reverse and prevent desertification; it
also represents progressive development in the tools and doctrines of
international environmental law. The hallmark of the Desertification
Convention is its "bottom-up" approach. Other international environmental
conventions obligate states to centralize and expand their powers of regulation.
The Desertification Convention, however, obligates states to channel authority
and resources down to local land users and particularly to non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). The Convention does not mandate new regulations,
instead, it mandates new alliances and new partnerships that link international
institutions, states, NGOs, and communities. The Convention creates new
legal modalities and mechanisms that give form to these partnerships.
This radically different approach is necessitated by the nature of the
problem. A set of international, national, and local conditions are inducing
millions of rural people to over-exploit ecologically fragile lands. To make
these unsustainable patterns of land use sustainable requires an approach that
not only addresses international macro-economic conditions but also confronts
local development issues.
The bottom-up approach offers a promising set of doctrines, norms, and
mechanisms to international environmental law. Damaging patterns of land
use are among the principal causes of a majority of the world's other
environmental harms. Future protocols of the international conventions on
climate change and biodiversity, as well as initiatives related to the non-
binding world forestry agreement, will have to address land use issues.' The
1. UNITED NATIONS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE FOR A CONVENTION TO
COMBAT DESERTIFICATION, ELABORATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION TO COMBAT
DDESERTIFICATION IN COUNTRIES EXPERIENCNG SERIOUS DROUGHT AND/OR DESERTIFICATION,
PARTICULARLY IN AFRICA, U.N. Doc. A/AC.241M27 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1328 [hereinafter DESERTIFICATION
CONVENTION].
2. The Desertification Convention was a product of the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (UNCED) held in Brazil in 1992. Delegates to UNCED also produced two other binding
international conventions: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Miscellaneous
Doc. [ST/]DPI/1300-Oct. 1992, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 [hereinafter Framework Convention on Climate
Change]; and Convention on Biological Diversity, U.N. Miscellaneous Doc. [ST/]DPI/1307-Oct. 1992, June
5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 [hereinafter Biodiversity Convention]. In addition to these binding conventions,
delegates adopted the Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus
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Desertification Convention provides a valuable model for international
environmental policymakers.
The Convention is also a striking model for the development of
international law generally. A major departure from traditional state-centric
international jurisprudence, the Desertification Convention provides a
blueprint for future international regimes that incorporate the broad spectrum
of governmental and non-governmental actors.
U. DESERTIFICATION: A BACKGROUND ON THE PROBLEM
A. The Definition and Extent of Desertification
The Convention defines desertification as "land degradation in arid, semi-
arid and dry sub-humid areas resulting from various factors, including
climactic variations and human activities."3  The term "desertification"
encompasses several forms of biological degradation occurring in "drylands."
Drylands are areas that are marked by low annual precipitation and,
consequently, are ecologically fragile.4  Drylands that are potentially
productive constitute nearly thirty-five percent of the Earth's land area.'
Mismanagement of drylands has had disastrous consequences throughout
world history. Improper irrigation practices played a significant role in the
collapses of the Sumerian and Babylonian empires.6 Overcultivation in the
American Great Plains precipitated the "Dust Bowl" conditions of the 1930s,
during which an estimated 3.5 million people left their farms.7
on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, June 13, 1992,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26/Rev.I (vol. I), Annex 111, 31 L.L.M. 881 (1992) [hereinafter Forestry Principles].
The delegates also endorsed a non-binding action plan for sustainable development through the millennium.
Agenda 21, adopted June 13, 1992, U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 151/26/Rev.l (vols. I,1I,11I) (1992) [hereinafter
Article 21 ].
3. DESERTFicATIoN CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 1(a).
4. The Desertification Convention defines arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas as "areas, other
than polar and sub-polar regions, in which the ratio of annual precipitation to potential evapotranspiration
falls within the range from 0.05 to 0.65." Id art. 1(g).
5. United Nations Environmental Programme, Report of the Executive Director, Status of
Desertification and Implementation of the United Nations Plan of Action to Combat Desertification at xiii,
UNEP/GCSS.111/3 (199 1)[hereinafter Status ofDesertification].
6. Christopher C. Joyner, Towards Transnational Management of Desertification: The Eco-Politics
of Global Concern, 16 INT'L LAW. 67, 67 (1982).
7. DAVID S.G. THOMAS &NICHOLAS J. MIDDLETON, DESERTIFICATION: EXPLODING THE MYTH 22-23
(1994).
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Though estimating the extent of desertification is difficult and
problematic, the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) estimates
that of productive drylands, nearly seventy percent--or twenty-five percent of
the Earth's total land area--are threatened by desertification. This threatened
area is the home and source of livelihood to nearly 900 million people,
approximately one-fifth of the world's population.8 The Food and Agriculture
Organization asserts that each year, desertification is rendering practically
barren seven million hectares of formerly cultivable drylands, an area
approximately the size of Ireland.9
A persisting image of the problem of desertification is that of deserts
encroaching upon formerly productive lands. This common depiction is a
distortion. The regions threatened by desertification encompass a far greater
area than merely the fringes of the world's deserts. Moreover, the oscillation
of desert fringes seems to be a distinct phenomenon, related almost entirely
to climate variation and of a smaller magnitude than historically assumed.'0
Though dryland regions exist on nearly each of the continents, there is a
strong correlation between poverty and drylands. Consider the total land area
of the world's developing countries. The poorest, least developed countries--
in which annual per capita income averages under $500--make up twenty
percent of that total land area. These same countries, however, contain sixty-
three percent of all the drylands in developing countries." The Sahelian
region of Africa, which includes Cape Verde and portions of Senegal,
Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and the Sudan, consists largely
of drylands. Severe drought, extensive poverty, rapid population growth, and
political instability have exacerbated the consequences of desertification in
this region. The concentration of the world's poorest people on inherently
ecologically fragile lands drives the need for an effective international
response to desertification.
8. Status of Desertification, supra note 5, at xiii.
9. Angeline Oyog, Environment: Convention Agrees Accord to Stop Growth of Deserts, INTER PREss
SERVICE, June 18, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, CURNWS File.
10. Mike Hulme & Mick Kelly, Exploring the Links Between Desertification and Climate Change,
ENVIRONMENT, July-Aug. 1993, at 4, 7.
11. Robert W. Kates & Viola Haarman, Where the Poor Live, ENVIRONMENT, May 1992, at 5, 7.
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B. Desertification: Manifestations and Consequences
The manifestations of desertification vary considerably by region, even
by locality, and encompass more than merely the appearance of desert-like
conditions. Soil can grow vulnerable to wind and water erosion. Flooding
can increase as soil erodes. Irrigated lands may become salinized as water
tables drop. In croplands, yields may diminish. In rangelands, vegetation for
livestock feed can be reduced. Woody biomass can decline, increasing the
distance one must travel for fuelwood. Water resources for drinking and for
agriculture can subside. 2
The consequences of these various forms of biological degradation can be
severe. By one measure, direct financial losses from desertification amount
to $42.3 billion annually. 3  Much of this financial loss consists of
desertification's toll on global agricultural productivity. Their ecological
fragility notwithstanding, drylands currently generate at least one-fifth of the
world's agricultural output. 4 The process of desertification is reducing this
output significantly, harming most severely-the poor countries that rely on
drylands for food. Already, according to UN officials, between ninety to
ninety-five percent of the world's food aid flows to dryland regions."5 UNEP
officials recently declared, "If the process of desertification is not arrested in
the near future, the world shortage of food will increase dramatically within
a few decades."'"
Desertification causes other socio-economic disruptions. People are
abandoning desertified drylands in large numbers, joining the world's growing
12. Status of Desertification, supra note 5, at 3.
13. H. Dregne et al., A New Assessment of the World Status of Desertification, DESERTIFICATION
CONTROL BULL., No. 20, 1991, at 6, 15. According to the authors, this figure-which represents income
foregone--is a "very rough" aggregate of widely-varying estimates in different countries. Dregne also has
cited a State of New Mexico study which found that the indirect, off-cite costs of wind erosion were 45
times greater than the direct, on-site costs. H. Dregne, Desertification Costs: Land Damage and
Rehabilitation, UNEP, Dec. 1990/Feb. 1991. All monetary figures cited in this article are denominated
in United States dollars.
14. R.L. HEATHCOTE, THE ARID LANDS: THEIR USE AND ABUSE 296 (1983).
15. Franklin Cardy, Desertification: A Fresh Approach, OUR PLANET: DESERTIFICATION ISSUE,
(1995), available in Econet conference: inc.desert, topic No. 239. According to the FAO, most of the
world's 800 million under-nourished people live in drylands. Brad Knickerbocker, Environmental Wear
in Dry-Land Areas, CHISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 25, 1994, at 14. *
16. William C. Bums, The International Convention to Combat Desertification: Drawing a Line
in the Sand?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 831, 846 (1995).
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number of "environmental refugees."' 7 One estimate places the number of
individuals at risk of displacement as a result of desertification at over 135
million people per year."
The displacement of individuals resulting from desertification is triggering
additional problems. Desertification refugees may find only more marginal
drylands available. Thus, they begin the cycle of degradation anew. 9 Other
displaced peoples are joining a massive exodus of rural individuals to cities.
Urbanization in countries affected by desertification currently ranges from
eight to ten percent annually.2° These rising rates of displacement and
urbanization implicate environmental security issues. Uprooted rural
individuals competing for productive lands or for jobs in cities teeming with
people are a source of social unrest. The impoverishment and instability
precipitated by the growing scarcity of cultivable soil in drylands regions has
the potential to stimulate violent conflicts within and among already unstable
states.'
In addition to these socio-economic consequences, the process of
desertification also endangers common resources. The process of degradation
17. See generally JODI L. JACOBSON, ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES: A YARDSTICK OF HABITABILITY,
Worldwatch Paper 86 (Nov. 1988); Arthur H. Westing, Environmental Refugees: A Growing Category of
Displaced Persons, 19 ENv'T CONSERVATION 201 (1992).
18. Arthur H. Westing, The Almeria Statement on Desertification and Migration, 21 ENV'T
CONSERVATION 179, 180 (1994). The Statement asserts that "the corollary of the recognized right of
freedom of movement is the right to remain." Id at 181. Though determining the factors that induce
individuals to migrate is difficult, estimates of individuals uprooted by desertification are striking. Some
estimates include: one-fifth of the population of Burkina Faso and one-sixth of the population of Niger.
Bums, supra 16, at 839, n.40 citing INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL HuMANITARiAN ISSUES,
THE ENCROACHING DESERT (1986), at 29. World-wide migration caused by desertification may be as high
as 2,000 to 3,000 individuals a day. John Madeley, For Millions, Life is a Battle Against the Sand, THE
GAZETT1E (Montreal), June 26, 1993, at 16, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WORLD File.
19. Status of Desertification, supra note 5, at 13.
20. Id. at 12.
21. Thomas Homer-Dixon, who has analyzed the links between environmental change and
international security, observes:
I propose that poor countries will in general be more vulnerable to environmental change
than rich ones. . . . In these countries, a range of atmospheric, terrestrial and aquatic
environmental pressures will in time probably produce, either singly or in combination, four
main, causally interrelated social effects: reduced agricultural production, economic decline,
population displacement, and disruption of regular and legitimized social relations. These social
effects, in turn, may cause several specific types of acute conflict, including scarcity disputes
between countries, clashes between ethnic groups, and civil strife and insurgency, each with
potentially serious repercussions for the security interests of the developed world.
Thomas Homer-Dixon, On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict, 2
INTERNATIONAL SECURrrY, 76, 78 (1991).
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in drylands threatens elements of global biodiversity, particularly core
agricultural species. One team of experts has observed:
Many crops (wheat, barley, sorghum, millet, etc.) and fodder species
that form the backbone of world agriculture and pasture husbandry,
have their origins in arid and semi-arid territories ... The impact of
desertification on loss of germplasm resources may be, from an
economic point of view, no less severe than the impact of
deforestation.'
The potential effects of desertification on climate change are disputed but
probably minor. Estimates of non-industrial contributions to climate change,
though difficult to quantify, are estimated to constitute five to fifteen percent
of total radiative forcing. Tropical deforestation, however, causes the greatest
percentage of these non-industrial emissions; desertification causes a much
smaller fraction.'
C. Desertification: Causes
The most frequently cited human activities that cause desertification fall
in the following categories: overgrazing, overcultivation, deforestation, and
mismanaged irrigation. 4 Climatic variations, principally droughts caused by
declining rainfall, are thought to intensify degradation caused by human
activities.25
What precipitates unsustainable uses of drylands? Mere ignorance on the
part of the land-users is not a complete answer. Individuals have used
drylands for centuries. Experts have found that, under circumstances of social
stability, even quite poor individuals and communities in dryland regions have
implemented sophisticated and successful means of preventing dryland
degradation. Thus, the question is: what influences have disrupted otherwise
22. M. Kassas et al., Desertification and Drought: An Ecological and Economic Analysis,
DESERTIFICATION CONTROL BULL., No. 20, 1991, at 22,23.
23. Hulme & Kelly, supra note 10, at 8.
24. See, e.g., Kassas et al., supra note 22, at 21-22; Sandra Postel, Land's End, WORLD WATCH, May-
June 1989, at 12, 13; THOMAS & MIDDLETON, supra note 7, at 67. ("Different authors have organised these
causes in different ways but generally they fall under the headings of overgrazing, overcultivation and
deforestation. Salinisation on irrigated cropland, a clear-cut desertification resulting from human actions,
is often viewed as a separate category from the aforementioned.").
25. Status of Desertification, supra note 5, at 3.
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sustainable patterns of use? Desertification experts point to myriad socio-
economic and political conditions that are driving dryland mismanagement.
One factor is population pressure. The population of ten countries in the
Sahelian region of Africa increased from 60 million to 107 million between
1960 and 1987, a period during which the area was plagued with severe
desertification, drought, and famine.26  Growing populations mean growing
migrations into drylands by people who have had insufficient experience with
the sustainable use of drylands. Population growth in dryland countries also
increases demand for food. This increased demand promises large short-term
awards to those farmers and pastoralists who intensify cultivation and grazing.
Growing populations demand not only more food but also more energy.
Because ninety percent of the developing world relies on wood as fuel for
energy, this energy demand drives deforestation in drylandsY
National policies also are a root condition of desertification. In most
developing countries, rural people are on the political margins; developing
country governments have demonstrated a distinct bias favoring urban
consumers over rural producers. Several affected countries have imposed
pricing policies that subsidize food for urban populations at the expense of
rural farmers and pastoralists. As a result, rural populations are deprived of
resources needed to invest in sustainable practices."
Even when land-users have adequate resources to invest in such practices,
insecure land tenure, another national policy failure, can discourage them from
making those investments. Absent secure tenure, rural land-users have an
incentive to practice "hit-and-run" grazing and farming, maximizing the yield
from lands from which they may be evicted at any time.29 Land is also needed
as collateral for investments in seeds, fertilizer, and other items necessary for
long-term productivity. Without ownership of land, farmers do not have the
26. THOMAS & MIDDLETON, supra note 7, at 92, citing IUCN, THE IUCN SAHEL STUDIES (1989).
27. Joel Schechter, New Frontiers in Desert Research, in DESERT DEV. 287, 305 (Yehuda Gradus ed.,
1985). However, the link between changes in population are not necessarily straightforward. The rate of
population growth should be distinguished from the density of population. In some areas, migration of
individuals to cities has deprived dryland communities of the human power needed to implement
desertification prevention practices. Robert Paarlberg observes: "In much of Africa, rural labor shortages
frequently cause many traditional resource-conserving tasks-such as proper soil preparation, mulching,
terrace maintenance, and weeding-to be left undone." Robert Paarlberg, The Politics ofAgricultural Abuse,
ENVIRONMENT, Oct. 1994, at 6, 34.
28. See generally ROBERT BATES, MARKETS AND STATES IN TROPICAL AFRICA: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF AGRICULTURAL POLICIES (1981); MERILEE GRINDLE, STATE AND COUNTRYSIDE:
DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND AGRICULTURAL POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA (1986); MICHAEL LIPTON, WHY
POOR PEOPLE STAY POOR: URBAN BIAS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT (1977).
29. Paarlberg, supra note 27, at 36.
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collateral for these agricultural assets. Without the tools, farmers are induced
to wear out the land and abandon it.30
Land tenure in many affected countries is not only insecure but
inequitable as well. The patronage systems in many developing countries
favor politically powerful and wealthy farmers. These farmers assemble large
holdings and increasingly drive poorer land-users into more marginal lands.
Inequitable policies toward women are particularly damaging. It is estimated
that women are responsible for eighty percent of the food their families eat
and, with the help of their children, collect water and wood for heating and
cooking. Yet women, throughout the developing world, do not have rights to
their husbands' property, do not have equal access to credit, and are not
permitted to particpate in training programs designed to educate land-users
about sustainable practices."
To the extent that rural land-users are unaware of practices that cause
degradation and are ignorant of means to prevent such degradation, rural
extension services should be providing training and education. Weak
institutions and the aforementioned urban bias in many affected countries
have precluded such awareness and capacity-building programs.
The driving mechanisms are not confined to weaknesses or neglect in
national policies and institutions. International politics and macroeconomic
policies also influence dryland mismanagement. Aspects of the current state
of international trade have been linked to desertification. The extensive
cultivation in Africa of certain water and soil-intensive cash crops for
international markets--groundnuts and cotton, particularly--has been linked
to widespread degradation. Another trade-related condition was highlighted
during the negotiations of the Convention: the "dumping" of agricultural
products subsidized in developed countries into developing country markets.
Since 1984, the European Community has spent approximately $420 million
in export subsidies for beef production. These generous subsidies have
encouraged European farmers to produce an amount of beef far in excess of
that demanded by European markets. In 1991, Europeans exported 54,000
tons of cut-rate beef to Africa. Local prices for beef in Africa plummeted.
African pastoralists could not overcome this subsidized competition. The
30. Postel, supra note 24, at 15.
31. Id.
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pastoralist's unsold inventory-vast herds of cattle-grazed the Sahel to an
excess.
32
The process of desertification is thus driven by a myriad of influences and
conditions. Desertification is not caused by emissions of a certain kind of
substance or a particular pattern of economic activity, thus it cannot be
addressed through the uniform application of particular kinds of technologies
or practices. Instead, it is largely a socio-economic phenomenon through
which a range of local, national, and international conditions marginalize
people and induce them to over-exploit relatively fragile resources.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO DESERTIFICATION 1977-1991
A. The United Nations Conference on Desertification (UNCOD) and the Plan
ofAction to Combat Desertification (PACD)
The international community first confronted the problem of
desertification in the early 1970s during the height of the drought and famine
in the Sahel. It has been estimated that 100,000 to 250,000 people and more
than ten million cattle perished in this region of Africa during the late 1960s
and early 1970s." As television images of starving people were transmitted
around the world, a community of scientists asserted that extended periods of
low rainfall alone were not the cause of the problem but were exacerbating
degradation caused by human action. Moreover, these scientists identified this
problem as a threat facing many regions of the world.
In response to the crisis and the problem which had been identified as its
cause, the United Nations convened the United Nations Conference on
Desertification (UNCOD). UNCOD met from August 29 to September 9,
1977 in Nairobi, Kenya. Ninety-four countries participated. Delegates to the
UNCOD adopted a non-binding Plan of Action to Combat Desertification
(PACD).34 Developing and negotiating the PACD "engendered surprisingly
32. The Issue that Won't Go Away, ECO No. 5, Sept. 26, 1994, available in Econet conference:
inc.desert, topic No. 83. Christian Aid, an NGO from the United Kingdom, introduced a report on this issue
during negotiations for the Desertification Convention.
33. Steven L. Rhodes, Rethinking Desertification: What Do We Know and What Have We Learned?,
19 WORLD DEV. 1137, 1137(1991).
34. UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON DESERTIFICATION: ROUND-UP, PLAN OF
ACTION, AND RESOLUTIONS, at 1 (1978) [hereinafter PACD].
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little controversy, and debate involved only relatively minor amendments with
very few differences in views on substantive matters."35
The PACD's "ultimate objective" is to "sustain and promote, within
ecological limits, the productivity of arid, semi-arid, sub-humid and other areas
vulnerable to desertification in order to improve the quality of life of their
inhabitants."36 The drafters envisioned complete implementation of the PACD
by the year 2000."
The PACD consists of twenty-eight recommendations. The plan suggests
that affected countries: undertake evaluations and monitor desertification;
develop national plans for combating desertification that integrate relevant
sectors and are incorporated into national development programs; create
insurance funds to compensate people during times of drought; and strengthen
science and technology research. The cornerstone of the proposed approach
is well-researched, holistic, national plans. Affected countries are to develop
these plans with the support of the international community.
The PACD is extraordinarily comprehensive. Though the document is
structured in the form of twenty-eight "recommendations," it actually consists
of 102 paragraphs, each with several "sub-paragraphs," that contain a variety
of observations about and suggestions for combating desertification. The sheer
number and variety of recommendations may be partially explained by the
non-binding nature of the document. No recommendation was a legal
obligation; therefore, drafters could assemble a "dream list" of suggestions.
Many of the suggested actions have been characterized as large-scale
technical fixes. 8 In a typical passage, the PACD urges affected countries to
prevent soil loss through dust storms by "stabilizing sand surfaces by the use
of matting, mulches, chemical, bituminous or any other economically viable
products, vegetating dune surfaces, reshaping dunes and removing slip faces
where necessary."39
Interspersed among these recommendations for generic technical fixes are
statements and suggestions that acknowledge the local specificity of
desertification and the need to incorporate rural land-users in the planning of
policy responses. The PACD recommends that public participation be made
35. Joyner, supra note 6, at 81.
36. PACD, supra note 34, para. 10, at 7.
37. Id
38. Joyner, supra note 6, at 83.
39. PACD, supra note 34, para. 45(jXiii), at 21.
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"an integral element" of combating desertification. ° The PACD also
acknowledges the importance of utilizing local knowledge in the preparation
of national plans, expanding the role of "community organizations," and
transfering technologies appropriate for local conditions. 4' These elements of
a bottom-up approach which were progressive for a 1977 international
environmental plan are, however, almost entirely obscured by the laundry list
of large-scale technical solutions that fill the rest of the PACD.
According to practically all commentators, UNCOD and the PACD
generated some amount of awareness but little and largely ineffective action.
Why after an international conference and a carefully-constructed plan of
action was the international response to desertification so ineffective?
One oft-cited stumbling block is the distorting multitude of definitions
and images of "desertification" that persisted throughout the 1977-1992
period. In 1983, two experts catalogued over 100 definitions of desertification
appearing in scientific literature. 2 Also, early researchers of dryland
degradation created a kind of Faustian bargain by naming the phenomenon
which they observed "desertification." On the one hand, the vivid image
suggested by the phrase--sand dunes engulfing formerly fertile lands--has
possibly generated more action than that which "degradation of drylands"
might have generated. One expert has called it a "stroke of political genius. '43
The term, however, encouraged many in the international community to focus
their attention almost exclusively on true, hyper-arid deserts instead of on the
semi-arid and sub-humid areas "where the real problem is."" Moreover, the
term associated the problem with the more limited phenomenon of desert
oscillation. As noted above, studies throughout the 1980s and early 1990s
have found that deserts have migrated less than was assumed, and that this
movement has been almost entirely a product of changes in the amount of
rainfall. A litany of articles have exposed this "myth of the marching desert"'45
and damaged the credibility of the larger problem of desertification among
policy-makers.
40. Id. para. 27, at 13.
41. Id. para. 16(o), at 9; para. 28(d), at 13; and para. 75(b), at 27.
42. Michael Glantz & Nicolai Orlovsky, Desertification: A Review of the Concept,
DESERTIFICATION CONTROL BULL., No. 9, 1983, at 15, 15.
43. H. E. Dregne, Reflections on the PACD, DESERTIFICATION CONTROL BULL., No. 15, 1987, at 8,
8.
44. Richard S. Odingo, The Definition of Desertification: Its Programmatic Consequences for UNEP
and the International Community, DESERTIFICATION CONTROL BULL., No. 18, 1990, at 34, 46.
45. Bill Forse, The Myth of the Marching Desert, NEw SCIENTIsT, Feb. 4, 1989, at 31.
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Another factor undermining the credibility of desertification and
discouraging the international response has been the difficulty of obtaining
reliable assessments of the problem. A consensus exists that monitoring
projects throughout the entire 1977-1992 period have been inadequate. One
critic has called the global percentages of degraded drylands distributed by
UNEP "estimates based on guesstimates."46 Yet, during the 1977-1992
period, UNEP cited these statistics dogmatically, creating a misleading
perception of the extent of the problem and the level of certainty about this
extent. In the late 1980s, UNEP's overheated rhetoric generated a backlash
of sorts in the scientific community and encouraged a "revisionist critique."47
In 1993, UNEP Executive Director Elizabeth Dowdeswell acknowledged the
limitations of existing data: "UNEP openly admits that the best assessments
from an extended network of national experts worldwide, leave much to be
desired in terms of statistical accuracy and detail."4
Even before the revisionist critique, however, few governments of
affected and donor countries appeared prepared to make combating
desertification a priority. Though the PACD had highlighted the importance
of national action plans as the key first step, only twenty affected developing
country governments submitted such plans and they were generally of poor
quality.49 A. Buonajuti lists some of the factors leading to the inadequacy of
the policy response of these governments:
Many governments did not recognize the enormity of the
desertification threat, or appreciate the costs or complex processes of
desertification. They found it difficult to undertake holistic planning
by breaking through traditional bureaucratic boundaries that cause
sectoral planning by their various ministries and did not and still do
not have a clear-cut multi-sectoral governmental organ to coordinate
the implementation of the PACD. Political instability and hostilities
in many countries suffering from desertification were a difficult
setting within which to mount an effective programme for dealing
with environmental problems of natural resources. Moreover,
46. THOMAS & MIDDLETON, supra note 7, at 67.
47. Rhodes, supra note 33, at 1139.
48. Elizabeth Dowdeswell, Editorial, OUR PLANET: DESERTIFICATION ISSUE (1995), available in
Econet conference: inc.desert, topic No. 239.
49. A. Buonajuti, External Evaluation of the Plan of Action to Combat Desertification,
DESERTIFICATION CONTROL BULL., No. 20, 1991, at 30, 31.
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desertification problems were aggravated by the hostilities and
consequent influx of refugees."
Confronting a scarcity of resources, national governments relied largely
on short-term fixes that could generate immediate returns. Most of these
projects have proved ineffective over the long-term." The marginalization of
rural land-users from strongly centralized dryland governments also
undermined responses on the national level. Without the participation of local
communities, national projects lacked the insights of those with local
knowledge, were inappropriate for local conditions, and were not sustained by
their recipients. 2  An UNEP external evaluation of the PACD succinctly
concluded: "In some cases where governments did implement measures to
combat desertification, the impact was insufficient because they lacked
community participation and support." 3
Donor support was insufficient. Some estimates indicate that in the
aggregate, aid for projects related to combating desertification in developing
countries amounted to only $0.6 billion per year during the early 1980s. By
comparison, UNEP estimates that, over the next twenty years, affected
developing countries will require $2.4 billion per year in external aid if they
are to undertake preventative, corrective, and rehabilitative measures.'
When donor aid did flow to desertification rehabilitation or prevention
projects, it was largely ineffective. In designing or selecting projects to fund,
donors usually did not consult the recipient country's national action plan even
when one was available. As a result, aid was largely uncoordinated and
unprioritized." Donor-supported projects were marked by the same
characteristics as projects undertaken by affected countries alone: short-term,
overly large-scale, and planned and implemented in a top-down manner.
A representative project of the period was the "Green Sahel" project. This
donor-funded scheme had as its objective the afforestation of a region crossing
50. Id
51. Status of Desertification, supra note 5, at 41. See also Buonajuti, supra note 49, at 31.
52. Cardy, supra note 15. See also Status of Desertification, supra note 5, at 41.
53. Buonajuti, supra note 49, at 32. See also THOMAS & MIDDLETON, supra note 7, at 155; Harma
A. Diallo, Dealing with Real People, OUR PLANET: DESERTIFICATION ISSUE (1995), available in Econet
conference: inc.desert, topic No. 239. ("The local population was often longing to see a project completed
--because then the people from abroad, or even their own capital city would withdraw and they could get
back to business as usual. After about three years nothing of the scheme would be left.").
54. Status of Desertification, supra note 5, at 67.
55. Diallo, supra note 53.
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through several Sahelian countries. Commentators uniformly describe the
project as poorly-conceived. A more effective use of resources would have
been a number of smaller projects responsive to local conditions and needs.56
The project's execution was disastrous. Organizers did not consult or gain the
support of the numerous communities within the area and, therefore, found
themselves unable to sustain tree-planting efforts.
As a whole, during the 1977-1992 period, most efforts to combat
desertification focused on these large-scale, top-down efforts. At the same
time, evidence was growing that such responses could not effectively prevent
and reverse over-exploitation of drylands. Increasingly, desertification experts
suggested that the process of desertification is too locally-specific to be
effectively "combated" with regional schemes conceived solely by
governments and international organizations. An influential 1990 World Bank
paper by Ridley Nelson observed that "the complexity and local variability of
the problem of land degradation suggests that there are no global or regional
technological solutions and that large programs such as tree belts across Africa
are not a solution . . . ."" In addition, as the socio-economic aspects of
desertification became clearer, experts gradually understood that efforts to
respond to desertification must engage land-users in both planning and
implementation. Nelson asserted that "the need is to get spontaneous
responses from millions of small farmers and pastoralists rather than for
government to tax them to get the money and do it for them."" In 1994, David
S.G. Thomas observed that the international response to desertification "needs
not grand global and national plans, but planning with and by local people,
building on the systems used in many of these areas for centuries."59
The success stories from 1977-1992 provided support to this growing
consensus. Effective in-the-field desertification projects consisted almost
entirely of community-oriented efforts. In Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Togo,
farmers formed a coalition of 1200 village groups aimed at sharing information
on sustainable dryland cultivation practices. The coalition operates "schools"
that teach group leaders better agricultural techniques and finances projects
56. THOMAS & MIDDLETON, supra note 7, at 155-56.
57. RIDLEY NELSON, WORLD BANK TECHNICAL PAPER NO. 116, DRYLAND MANAGEMENT: THE
"DESERTIFICATION" PROBLEM, (1990), at 22.
58. Id. at 23.
59. Geoff Tansey, The 'Grass Roots' Strategy for Holding Back the Deserts, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 14,
1994, at 31.
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suggested by the leaders.' In Senegal, the Organization of Rural Associations
for Progress (ORAP), an association of local groups, determined in the 1980s
that the switch from traditional drought-resistant crops to cash crops had
increased the groups' vulnerability to desertification. ORAP developed a new
approach; with the assistance of Oxfam-America (Oxfam), the organization
now makes loans to local groups to help them switch back to traditional seeds
and fertilizers and generally improve food production."' In rural Yemen,
farmers with experience in terrace-farming, a technique with which to cultivate
drylands, are working with NGOs to share their knowledge with farmers in
other parts of the country and with those in other dryland countries.6'
Grass-roots and international NGOs spearheaded almost all of these small-
scale, participatory efforts. Their effectiveness was lauded by an otherwise
disheartening 1984 UNEP review of the-progress of the PACD:
In some respects, NGOs have been the most effective agencies in the
campaign against desertification .... Their high record of success is
related to the small-scale and local direction of their projects and the
requirements for local community participation, as well as their
flexibility in operation and their ability to learn from other mistakes.
The dominance of field activities gives these actions an impact out of
proportion to the money invested. 3
In 1992, with the exception of these NGO efforts, it was apparent that the
PACD had failed to generate a sufficient response to the problem of
desertification. Assessments of the extent and location of affected areas
remained inadequate. The myth of the marching desert persisted, at once
oversimplifying the manifestations of the problem and making its solution
seem impossible. Affected-country governments and donors assembled an
uncoordinated series of large-scale projects that neglected local land-users
whose needs and actions constitute the core of the problem. Increasingly, the
international community learned that desertification was a problem of local
resource management, of marginalized people on marginal lands, and only
policy responses empowering those people would be successful.
60. LLOYD TIMBERLAKE, AFRICA IN CRISIS: THE CAUSES, THE CURES OF ENVIRONMENTAL
BANKRUPTCY 210-11 (Jon Tinker ed., 1985).
61. Id. at 212.
62. Tansey, supra note 59.
63. TIMBERLAKE, supra note 60, at 216-17.
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IV. THE DESERTIFICATION CONVENTION
A. Overview
At UNCED, African countries pressed for an international convention on
desertification. They cited the failure of the PACD and emphasized that no
problem better captured the crisis of the environment and development.'
Delegates to UNCED officially requested the U.N. General Assembly to
establish an intergovernmental negotiating committee on desertification.65
UNCED participants also agreed to include a chapter on desertification in
Agenda 21, the non-binding international action plan for sustainable
development. The chapter contains detailed recommendations for national,
regional, and international initiatives. '
Later that year, during its 47th session, the U.N. General Assembly
adopted resolution 47/188 calling for the establishment of an
"Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for the Elaboration of an
International Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa. 67
The resolution called for five negotiating sessions culminating in a Convention
by June 1994. The first session was to be held in Nairobi; the second in
Geneva; the third in New York; the fourth in Geneva; and the fifth in Paris.
Negotiations concluded on June 18, 1994. The Convention and its four
regional annexes were opened for signature on October 15, 1994. The
Convention enters into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit of
the fiftieth ratification." As of early October 1995, 110 states and regional
economic integration organizations have signed the convention and seven have
deposited instruments of ratification.69 The Executive Secretary of the
64. Bo Kjellen, A New Departure?, OUR PLANET: DESERTIFICATION ISSUE (1995), available in
Econet conference: inc.desert, topic No. 239.
65. Delegates Callfor Negotiation of Treaty to Stop Spread of Deserts, INT'L ENVTL. REP. -CURRENT
REP., June 17, 1992, at 416.
66. Agenda 21, supra note 2, at Ch. 12.
67. G.A. RES. 188, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 93d mtg. at 241, U.N. Doc. A/47/719 (1992).
68. DESERTIFICATION CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 36(l).
69. A Daily Report on the INC for the Elaboration of an International Convention to Combat
Desertification, 4 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL., No. 67, available in Econet conference: inc.desert, topic
No. 263.
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Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee predicts that the fiftieth ratification
will occur in mid-1996.70
1. Overview of the Text: Principles and General Obligations
The first paragraph in the article on "principles" articulates four of the
principal themes of the Convention: (1) local participation in planning and
implementing desertification programmes;" (2) improved coordination and
utilization of financial and other resources;' (3) the enhancement of
cooperation among governments, NGOs, and land users to improve
understanding of the problem;" and (4) recognition of the special needs and
vulnerability of affected developing countries.74
Article 4 sets out a number of "general obligations" that all the Parties
undertake. Among these are duties to adopt an integrated approach to
combating desertification; the Parties must address the physical, biological,
and socio-economic aspects of the problem." The Parties also agree that
eradicating poverty and improving international economic conditions are
elements of efforts to combat desertification.76
Article 5 contains a set of obligations specifically for affected country
Parties. To the extent that national circumstances allow, preventing
desertification must be a priority in national policies. The affected country
Parties must also agree to promote awareness among citizens and citizen
groups."
Article 6 summarizes obligations for the developed country Parties.
Among these obligations are duties to "provide substantial financial resources"
to affected developing country Parties to assist them with developing and
implementing action programmes.' Developed country Parties are also
obligated to promote and facilitate the access of affected developing countries
to "appropriate technology, knowledge and know-how. 79
70. Harma A. Diallo, Address at Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs (Oct. 9, 1995).
71. DESERTIFICATIONCONVENrION, supra note 1, art. 3(a).
72. Id. art, '3(b).
73. Id. art. 3(c).
74. Id. art. 3(d).
75. Id art. 4(2Xa).
76. Id. art. 4(2Xc).
77. Id arts. 5(a), (d).
78. Id art. 6(b).
79. Id art. 6(e).
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2. Overview of the Text: Action Programmes
In Article 9, the Convention identifies the development of national action
programmes (NAPs) as the "central element" of the strategy to combat
desertification, complemented by regional and subregional programmes as
necessary."0 Unlike the PACD, the greater part of which consists of
recommendations for the content of action programmes, the Desertification
Convention concentrates mostly on the process of developing the plans with
a few specific recommendations on content. Widespread participation and
holistic strategies are consistent themes in the Convention's elaboration of the
NAP process. The NAPs are developed and implemented through
"participatory mechanisms" and should integrate combating desertification
and eradicating poverty."' Affected Parties agree to closely link preparation
of the action programmes with the preparation of national development plans.
Developed country Parties agree to link their assistance to these action
programmes; Article 9, Section 2 states that priority "shall be given to
supporting" these programmes. 2
3. Overview of the Text: Financial Resources and Financial
Mechanisms
Financing was the most contentious issue in the negotiations. In general,
developing countries insisted on binding obligations from the developed
countries to provide new and additional funds for efforts by developing
countries to combat desertification. They also called for a new global fund to
administer the transfers of those resources or, in the alternative, a new
desertification portfolio or window in the Global Environment Facility
(GEF).83 The developing country delegates also sought commitment from
80. Id art. 9(l).
81. Id. art. 10(2Xa)-(g).
82. Id art. 9(2).
83. The Global Environment Facility (GEF) is an international financial mechanism designed to
transfer financial resources to developing countries to compensate them for the incremental costs of
implementating projects and programs that address global environment problems. The GEF funds projects
and programs in four focal areas; climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, biodiversity loss, and
pollution of international waters. The GEF currently is the interim financing mechanism for the Framework
Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity. It also adminsters the Montreal
Protocol Multilateral Fund. A partnership of three multilateral agencies manages the GEF; the World Bank;
the United Nations Development Programme, and the United Nations Environmental Programme. In its
1991-1994 pilot phase, the GEF received $1 billion U.S. in voluntary contributions from industrialized
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developed countries that each one would increase its official development aid
to at least 0.7 percent of its GNP." Developed countries had pledged such
increases as a part of the non-binding Agenda 21 signed at the 1992 Earth
Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Developed country delegates strongly opposed
these proposals. They argued that the current quantity of financial transfers
was sufficient. The greater failure of the PACD, they asserted, was the
inefficient and ineffective utilization of aid. The developed country delegates
insisted that a guarantee of new money was not necessary, and a new fund
would merely saddle the international community with a new bureaucracy.
From the first negotiating session, donor countries pressed for obligations to
improve the coordination of aid, the quality of national action programmes,
and the effective channeling of aid to the field level.
The compromise language on financing leaves the issue unsettled.
Developed countries have no obligations to provide new and additional funds.
The Convention does not establish a new desertification fund nor does it
promise a desertification portfolio in the Global Environment Facility.
Developed countries merely promise to provide "substantial" financial and
other resources as "mutually agreed.""5 They "undertake to . . . mobilize
substantial financial resources;"' "promote" the availability of new and
additional funds from the GEF;s7 and "explore" innovative methods of
financing including debt-for-nature swaps.8 In a measure consistent with the
Convention's emphasis on improving the utilization of existing aid flows, all
Parties, developed and developing countries alike, are obligated to "rationalize
and strengthen the management of resources already allocated."89
Rather than create a new "fund" in Article 21, the Parties compromised by
referring to new "financial mechanisms." ° The text is vague in its elaboration
of "financial mechanisms." It merely sets out aspirations for them; they are
countries. In 1994, these countries pledged $2 billion for the replenishment of the fund. See generally
Andrew Jordan, Paying the Incremental Costs of Global Environmental Protection: the Evolving Role of
the GEF, 36 ENVIRONMENT 12 (1994).
84. Summary of the Second Session of the INC for the Elaboration of an International Convention
to Combat Desertification, U.N. Intergovernmental Negotiating Comm., 2d Sess., 4 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS
BULL. No. 22, available in Econet conference: inc.desert, topic No. 88 [hereinafter Summary Report of the
Second Session].
85. DESERTIFICATION CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 6(b).
86. Id art. 20(2)(a).
87. Id art. 20(2Xb).
88. Id. art. 20(2)(d).
89. Id art. 20(5Xa).
90. Mohammad Kassas, Negotiations for the International Convention to Combat Desertification
(1993-1994), 7 INT'L ENVTL. AF. 176, 184 (1995).
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to be effective, efficient, participatory, and should channel resources to local
levels. The Article leaves it to the Conference of the Parties to give definition
to the favored mechanisms. Article 21 does indicate a preference for a certain
kind of mechanism, the "national desertification fund."9' Notably, even the
developed countries' vague pledges to transfer substantial resources to the
affected countries' are not connected in the text to the "financial
mechanisms." '3 Thus, the developed countries have no binding obligation to
channel financial transfers through these "mechanisms" whatever form they
may take.
Delegates from developed countries also effectively resisted the efforts to
make their Agenda 21 pledge of increasing official development aid a binding
obligation. They consented to repeating the Agenda 21 pledge in the
Convention's non-binding preamble section.' Even that non-binding pledge
was revised in the last three days of the Convention in favor of a paragraph
reading: "Reaffirming in this light the commitments of developed countries
as contained in paragraph 13 of chapter 33 of Agenda 21 ."' The commitment
is thus doubly diluted. It appears only in the Preamble of the Convention and,
even then, only by reference to Agenda 21, a non-binding document.
Other conventions that emerged from UNCED contained provisions
recognizing that developing countries could not be expected to meet their
obligations absent sufficient external aid, the Desertification Convention
merely acknowledges-within the non-binding Preamble section-that "it will
be difficult" for developing countries without such aid.'
In an eleventh hour compromise, the Parties agreed to the establishment
of a "Global Mechanism. '" Though the Convention defers to the final
authority of the Conference of the Parties over the operations and form of the
91. DESERTIFICATION CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 21(IXd).
92. Id arts. 6, 20.
93. Id art. 21.
94. Summary of the Fifth Session of the INC for the Elaboration of an International Convention to
Combat Desertification, U.N. Intergovernmental Negotiating Comm., 5th Sess., 4 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS
BULL., No. 55, available in Econet conference: inc.desert, topic No. 198 [hereinafter Summary Report of
the Fifth Session].
95. DESERTIFICATION CONVENTION, supra note 1, pmbl., para. 13.
96. Id. at prbl., para. 18; cf Biodiversity Convention, supra note 2, art. 20(4): "The extent to which
developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments under this Convention will depend
on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments under this Convention
related to financial resources and transfer of technology and will take fully into account the fact that
economic and social development and eradication of poverty are the first and overriding priorities of the
developing country Parties."
97. DESERTIFICATION CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 21(4).
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Global Mechanism, it is clearly not meant to be a new fund but rather a kind
of coordinating mechanism. According to the Convention, the Global
Mechanism will inventory relevant international cooperation programmes,
advise Parties on innovative financing methods, and provide information to
Parties, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs on available funds "in
order to facilitate coordination among them." In August 1995, the Parties
met for a sixth session and discussed different forms that the Global
Mechanism might take. They considered what were characterized as "low
potential" and "high potential" conceptions of the Global Mechanism." A
"low potential" Global Mechanism would only publicize resource gaps; it
would identify programs and initiatives particularly in need of aid. A "high
potential" Global Mechanism would essentially play a fundraising role by
catalyzing and leveraging financial resources. Developed and developing
country delegates split in a predictable fashion in the discussions. Developed
countries favored a "low potential" Global Mechanism; and developing
countries favored a "high potential" Global Mechanism. Resolution of the
question probably will have to wait until the Conference of the Parties begins
to meet.
4. Overview of the Text: Other Articles
A consistent theme in negotiations was the importance of improving
coordination between the planning and the use of financial resources. The
Convention emphasizes enhanced coordination among donors, developing
country governments, and local actors. The Parties are to create "operational
mechanisms, particularly at the national and field levels" that ensure the
"fullest possible coordination among developed country Parties, developing
country Parties, and relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations. . .. "'
The Convention also underscores the importance of capacity-building and
educational and awareness programs. During negotiations, delegates referred
98. Id. art. 21(5Xa)-(d).
99. A Daily Report on the Sixth Session of the Intergavernmental Negotiating Committee on the
Convention to Combat Desertification, 4 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL., No. 70, available in Econet
conference: inc.desert, topic No. 271 [hereinafter Daily Report on the Sixth Session].
100. DESERTIFICATION CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 14(2).
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to capacity-building as the "cornerstone" of the Convention."°  The
Convention contains more specific recommendations for the contents of
capacity-building programs than for the action programmes. These programs
shall include awareness programs; promote public access to information;
encourage the establishment of awareness-building organizations; develop and
exchange materials; assess general educational needs in affected areas and
design school programs to meet them; and develop awareness programs that
can be integrated into existing educational programs. 2
5. Overview of the Text: The Regional Annexes
At the first session, the Parties debated whether the Convention should be
a fully elaborated operative agreement, or a framework convention in
anticipation of further elaboration and more extensive obligations in protocols
to be negotiated in the future. Other conventions emerging from the Earth
Summit have adopted the framework-protocol format. Many Parties insisted
on a compromise: a framework convention with an operative annex for Africa,
in recognition of the urgency of the desertification problem on that
continent. 3 Developing countries from other regions resisted the compromise
approach, asserting that they are also suffering significantly. Many insisted
that a separate annex for Africa would merely be an instrument allowing
developed countries to provide new funding only to the African countries. In
the end, the African Annex was joined by three other regional annexes
covering Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Northern
Mediterranean.
The African Annex contains the most detailed measures and strongest
commitments. Unlike the Convention text and the three other regional
annexes, the African Annex lists several specific measures that should be
included in African country action programmes."' African countries also
undertake to execute these programmes without waiting for the Convention to
enter into force.0 5  Acknowledging the priority of assisting Africa, the
101. A Daily Report on the INC for the Elaboration of an International Convention to Combat
Desertification, 4 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL. No. 19, available in ECONET conference: inc.desert, topic
No. 73.
102. DESERTIFICATION CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 19(3Xa)-(f).
103. Kassas, International Convention to Combat Desertification, supra note 90, at 178.
104. DESERTIFICATION CONVENTION, supra note I, Regional Implementation Annex for Africa, art.
8(3) [hereinafter Annex I].
105. Id. art. 7.
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developed country Parties agreed to concrete commitments for transferring
financial resources to the affected countries of Africa; they pledged to maintain
the current level of assistance or to increase that level."t
The other annexes are more general than the African Annex and more
hortatory than obligatory in form. The Annex for Latin America and the
Caribbean highlights links between desertification and issues of debt and
international macroeconomic conditions"° as well as the consequences of
desertification on biodiversity."' The Annex for the Northern Mediterranean
contains a provision specifically disqualifying countries in that region from
receiving external aid for desertification initiatives."°
B. Analysis: Macro-Level Obligations
To what extent does the Desertification Convention confront the problem
of desertification on international and national macro levels? International
macro level issues, trade, debt, aid, etc., are for the most part left to the
margins of the text. Developed country argued against including in the text of
the Convention any references to international economic conditions and
policies as factors contributing to desertification. They vehemently opposed
the establishment of obligations to address these conditions. Delegates from
developed countries successfully advocated the deletion of a paragraph within
the article on Principles stating that objectives of the Desertification
Convention included contributions to the eradication of poverty, greater
assurances of food and energy security, and the promotion of predictability and
stability of financial resources for developing countries." ° In the end, most of
these issues were transferred to the preamble. In that section, the issues are
recognized both as factors in the process of desertification and as
106. Id. art. 5(l)(b). The words of the text are curious. They say that the developed countries shall
"continue to allocate significant resources and/or increase resources to combat desertification .... " Despite
its either/or construction, this sentence, by one reading, seems to imply an obligation to increase the current
level of resources allocated no matter what: Developed countries can maintain current levels of assistance
and increase them or simply increase them.
107. Id. Regional Implementation Annex for Latin America and the Caribbean, art. 2(b) [hereinafter
Annex III].
108. Id. art. 2(a).
109. Id. Regional Implementation Annex for the Northern Mediterranean, art. 9 [hereinafter Annex
IV].
110. Negotiations Revert to Form, Eco No. 8, Jan. 26, 1994, available in ECONET conference:
inc.desert, topic No. 149.
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consequences of desertification. None of the Parties has any obligation to
address them.
According to developed countries, if the Convention became a
"receptacle" for international macroeconomic and political issues, it would be
more difficult to persuade their countries' publics that it would be an effective
agreement."' Consistent with this view, the developed country delegates
consented to the establishment of an obligation on all the Parties to "give due
attention" to trade and debt issues within the "relevant international and
regional bodies.""' Notably, however, this is not an obligation to "address"
nor even to "give due priority" to these issues. Moreover, it seems unlikely
that the World Trade Organization, presumably the "relevant" trade body, will
make the effects of agricultural subsidies on desertification a priority issue any
time soon.
The Convention addresses the national macro-level desertification issues--
security of land tenure, rural development policies, population pressures, etc.-
only to a slightly greater extent than the international issues. As with the
international issues, many of the national macro-level factors were shunted to
the Preamble where they are the responsibility of none of the Parties. Some
appear as measures that affected country Parties may include, "taking into
account the circumstances and requirements" of each Party, in national action
programmes."'
Though the main text of the Convention contains no binding commitments
to address the national macro causes of desertification, the African Annex
includes some commitments on these issues and may provide insight into how
future protocols might look. In Article 4, which lists general obligations of the
African country Parties, these Parties agree to make land tenure more
equitable; they undertake to "sustain and strengthen reforms currently in
progress toward greater decentralization and resource tenure.. ."'" ' Article 8,
which establishes obligations for the content of national action programmes,
emphasizes national policies to eradicate rural poverty generally. The affected
African country Parties commit to including in their action programmes "as
appropriate" a variety of very specific measures under the heading "measures
I 11. Daily Report on the INC for the Elaboration of an International Convention to Combat
Desertification, 4 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL., No. 27, available in ECONET conference: inc.desert, topic
No. 139.
112. DESERTIFICATION CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 4(2Xb).
113. Id. art. 10(4).
114. Id. Annex I, art. 4(2)(b).
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to improve the economic environment with a view to eradicating poverty."'" 5
These measures range from developing markets for farm and livestock
products to creating "price and tax policies and commercial practices that
promote growth.""' 6 According to the Annex, the programmes also should
address population; they shall include measures "defining and applying
population and migration policies to reduce population pressure on land." 17
C. Analysis: Micro-Level Obligations: the "Bottom-Up" Approach
The hallmark of the Desertification Convention is its elaboration of a
bottom-up approach for combating desertification. As early as the second
session, an identifiable consensus supported a bottom-up approach generally."8
By the fifth session, the Parties agreed that the action programmes should
involve local and NGO participation both in design and implementation." 9
The elements of the bottom-up approach developed in the Convention
consist of the following: participation by a range of land users in the planning
and implementation of action programmes; measures to increase the awareness
and capacity of land users; assurances that the importation of technology and
ideas is driven by local demand; a leading role for NGOs both as expert bodies
and as links to rural land users; and the development of coordinating and
financial mechanisms that ensure access to financial resources that will allow
land users and NGOs to implement the programmes.
1. The "Bottom-Up" Approach. Participation in Desertification Action
Programmes and in Sustainable Development Programmes
The Convention says that the national action programmes-the "central
element of the strategy" to combat desertification--should consist of local
development programmes that are based on participatory mechanisms. 2 ' The
national action programmes therefore shall:
115. Id. art. 8(3)(a).
116. Id. art. 8(3Xa)(i) and (ii).
117. Id art. 8(3XaXiii).
118. Summary Report of the Second Session, supra note 84.
119. Summary Report of the Fih Session, supra note 94.
120. DESERTIFICATION CONVENTION, spra note 1, art. 9(1).
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[P]rovide for effective participation at the local, national and regional
levels of non-government organizations and local populations, both
women and men, particularly resource users, including farmers and
pastoralists and their representative organizations, in policy planning,
decision-making, and implementation and review of national action
programmes.'
Notably, the Parties are obligated to provide for "effective participation"
of local stakeholders and NGOs. A duty to provide merely for their
"participation" arguably could be discharged by making only modest attempts
to keep local stakeholders and NGOs informed and involved. The Parties must
provide participation not only in implementing the programmes but also in
deciding on the content of the programmes. Participation is required during
continuing elaboration and revision; the plans "shall be updated through a
continuing participatory process .... .'"' This paragraph also gives identity to
the land users and land user groups of central importance--women as well as
men, pastoralists as well as farmers, and NGOs. These are the key actors of
the bottom-up process; they are referenced to throughout the text of the
Convention and the Annexes.
While the Latin American and Asian Annexes specifically refer to the
Convention's paragraph on participation in national action programmes," the
African Annex develops to an even greater extent the central role of land users
in the action programme process. This greater elaboration is consistent with
the African Annex's status as an operative agreement rather than a mere
convention-like agreement. According to the African Annex, empowerment
of local land users is not only a means to developing better action programmes
but also an end of such programmes. The obligation is in more qualified
language, but articulates clear goals. The programmes shall aim at:
[S]trengthening the capacity of local authorities and ensuring the
active involvement of local populations, communities and groups,
with emphasis on education and training, mobilization of non-
121. Id art. 1o(2Xf).
122. Id art. 9(1).
123. Id Annex III, art. 3(2) and Regional Implementation Annex for Asia, art. 4(2) [hereinafter Annex
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governmental organizations with proven expertise and strengthening
of decentralized government structures.'24
The African Parties agreed to obligations not only to enhance participation
of land users in desertification action programmes, but also to develop a
process which can maximize their participation in planning national
sustainable development programmes generally. In Article 6, concerning the
"[s]trategic planning framework for sustainable development," these Parties
agree to undertake a "consultative and participatory process" involving local
populations and NGOs to "provide guidance on a strategy . . . to allow
maximum participation from local populations and communities.' ' 25  This
language seems to create a binding obligation of decentralized development
planning within the African country Parties. Such obligations should help to
alleviate the political marginalization of rural land users. As noted earlier, this
marginalization is one of the socio-economic conditions at the root of
desertification.
2. The "Bottom-Up" Approach: Capacity-Building
Additional evidence of the bottom-up process' centrality in the
Desertification Convention is its extensive section on "Capacity building,
education, and public awareness."'" Though the language in this section more
closely approximates policy recommendations than strictly binding
obligations, one should not conclude that the parties are placing little emphasis
on this aspect of the response to desertification. Statements made during the
negotiations indicate that most delegates considered capacity-building the
"cornerstone of the Convention."'2 Indeed, the delegates expressed concern
about the daunting task of reaching hundreds of millions of rural people with
information about causes and cures for the problem of desertification.
The article defines capacity-building as "institution building, training and
development of relevant local and national capacities.' ' 2 In addition to some
measures aimed at institutions, the Parties agree to promote capacity-building
through a range of activities involving the key local actors identified in earlier
124. Id. Annex 1, art. 8(1).
125. Id. Annex 1, art. 6(2).
126. Id. art. 19.
127. Daily Report on the Sixth Session, Sept. 21, 1993, supra note 99.
128. DESERTIFICATION CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 19(1).
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articles.'"9  For example, the article emphasizes the importance of
strengthening rural extension services and training extension staff in
"participatory approaches.' 3 The article also promotes "fostering the use and
dissemination of the knowledge, know-how, and practices of local people in
technical cooperation programmes, wherever possible."''
The section on educational awareness programs contains strictly binding
obligations for the Parties. They are obligated to create and support programs
to educate the public in affected countries about the causes and effects of
desertification. "2 To meet these objectives the Parties "shall" among other
things, organize awareness campaigns and "promote" permanent public access
to "relevant information. '1 33
3. The "Bottom-Up" Approach: Technology, Knowledge, Know-how,
and Practices
Articles on technology transfer are common to international environmental
law agreements. The article on technology in the Desertification Convention,
however, is unique in that it essentially dictates that the management of
technology for combating desertification should be driven by the demands of
rural land users. In this way, it is consistent with the bottom-up process that
the Convention develops.
The Parties "shall, in particular ... facilitate access .... to technologies
most suitable to practical application for specific needs of local populations."'34
The Parties also must pay "special attention" to the cultural, economic, and
environmental impacts of the technology. 3
In addition to calling for Parties to transfer technology to local levels, the
Convention recognizes the value of the technology, knowledge, and practices
of local land-users. The Parties commit themselves, with significant
129. Id. art. 19(lXa).
130. Id art. 19(IXc).
131. Id. art. 19(l)(d).
132. Id. art. 19(3).
133. Id. art. 19(3)(a), (f).
134. Id. art. 18(lXb). There is a similar obligation articulated within the article on "information
collection, analysis and exchange." According to that article, the Parties "shall, as appropriate ... ensure
that the collection and exchange of information address the needs of local communities and those of decision
makers, with a view to resolving specific problems, and that local communities are involved in these
activities." Id. art. 16(b).
135. Id. art. 18(lXb). It should be noted, however, that this obligation is not strictly binding; an
obligation to "facilitate" access is not as binding as an obligation to "provide" access.
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qualifications, to protecting and promoting such local knowledge and
practices,"3 and the Convention sets out several steps through which to achieve
these aims.
4. The "Bottom- Up" Approach: Special Roles for NGOs
NGOs were an important element of the negotiations and the text reflects
their central role in the bottom-up process created by the Convention. By the
fifth negotiating session, 230 NGOs were accredited and about fifty were
actively participating. 3 Southern Hemisphere NGOs dominated. By most
accounts, the participating NGOs were well-organized and effective.
The International Convention to Combat Desertification (INCD)
Chairman, Bo Kjellen of Sweden, emphasized even before the negotiating
sessions began that the participation in negotiations of NGOs from affected
developing countries would be essential. After the signing of the Convention,
when asked why the Convention would succeed where the PACD failed, he
pointed out that NGOs had participated in the design of the Convention but not
in the development of the PACD. 8
In the last few decades, the role of non-governmental organizations in
developing, implementing, and enforcing international environmental
initiatives has increased substantially. Non-governmental organizations are
participating in the drafting of international agreements, sometime as members
of the delegation of state parties. They monitor the performance of state
parties. They shame and expose those parties that do not comply with their
obligations. NGOs also are playing a major role in carrying out environmental
initiatives both in tandem with state agencies and independently.'39
Nonetheless, according to the majority view, NGOs do not have legal
personality in international law."4 Arguably, some legal personality attaches
to those NGOs with which intergovernmental organizations and convention
136. Id art. 18(2).
137. Summary Report of the Fifth Session, supra note 93.
138. More than 100 Countries Sign Convention on Desertification, BNA INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT DAILY, Oct. 18, 1994, available in LEXIS, Envim Library, BNAED File.
139. See generally A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Law: The Role of Non-Governmental
Organizations in the Development of international Environmental Law, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 61 (1993).
140. Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND DOCUMENTS, 346 (1993). Even those
who recognize the significant role of NGOs in the development of international environmental law,
acknowledge that, at the current time, they do not have legal personality in international law. See, e.g.
Tarlock, supra note 138, at 64.
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secretariats have established formal relationships. For example, the
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), an NGO, served
as the CITES secretariat for a significant period of time. Thus, to a certain
extent, international environmental law recognizes a norm that it is good
policy for intergovernmental organizations to consult with international NGOs
to acquire information both about the issue addressed by the organization and
about the performance of state parties. This minority view notwithstanding, the
variety and depth of the roles played by NGOs are not reflected in international
law.
Given this current state of international law, the Desertification
Convention represents a significant leap forward. In the text of the
Convention itself, there are twenty-two separate references to NGOs. These
references do not merely establish that a future desertification secretariat or
intergovernmental organization should create a formal relationship with an
NGO. The text obligates the state parties themselves to work with NGOs.
According to the international law established under the Convention, non-
governmental organizations shall be an integral element of the international
and national-level policy responses to desertification.
The Convention acknowledges two important roles of NGOs in the
bottom-up process. Because of their special links to the grass-roots, NGOs are
recognized as effective conduits through which the international community
can channel resources, information, and power to local populations. Thus,
within the text, they are consistently grouped among the key local actors-
women, farmers, pastoralists, local communities, local populations, etc.
The other role of NGOs recognized by the Convention is that of expert
bodies. Implicitly, NGOs are placed on equal footing with intergovernmental
organizations as organizations with whom Parties should consult and
coordinate." 1 In fact, the Convention consistently refers to intergovernmental
organizations and non-governmental organizations in tandem. The Parties
agree to develop national and field-level operational mechanisms to coordinate
the efforts of developed country Parties, developing country Parties, and
"relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations." '142 For the
purposes of collecting and analyzing data on desertification, the Parties must
141. Unlike NGOs, intergovernmental organizations have legal personality in international law. The
Convention's recurring references to intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations
in tandem suggests a developing norm which holds that "relevant" and "competent" NGOs have legal
personality to a degree equal to that of intergovernmental organizations.
142. DESERTIFICATION CONVENTION, supra note I, art. 14(2).
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make full use of "competent intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations" particularly for disseminating information to key actors.'
Similarly, cooperative efforts to transfer, acquire, and develop technology,
"shall be conducted... making full use of the expertise of intergovernmental
and non-governmental organizations.""' In undertaking educational and
awareness-building programs, the Parties "shall" cooperate with "competent
intergovernmental organizations, as well as non-governmental
organizations."' 45 Any financial mechanisms developed by the Conference of
the Parties shall provide information on available sources of funds "to
interested Parties and relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations" in order to promote cooperation among them.' Finally, NGOs
may attend meetings of the Conference of the Parties as observes unless at
least one-third of the Parties object.47
The emphasis on NGOs as expert groups notwithstanding, NGOs are not
promised positions on the Committee on Science and Technology established
in Article 24.
Given the expansive web of obligations, can one interpret the Convention
to establish a corresponding right on the part of NGOs to participate in state
and international policy responses to desertification? A strict reading of the
text locates no plain language establishing such a right. However, given the
various obligations of state parties to "provide for the effective participation"
of NGOs in the action programme process and to cooperate with and consult
with them in several specific policy areas, the Convention arguably should be
interpreted to establish a right of participation on the part of NGOs. Such an
interpretation would be consistent with the view of some scholars that a right
of citizen participation in environmental decision-making can be identified in
the broader corpus of international environmental and human rights law.
48
143. Id. art. 16(d).
144. Id. art. 18(l).
145. Id. art. 19(3).
146, Id art. 21(l)(d).
147, Id. art. 22(7). The Convention provides no definition of a "non-governmental organization."
-The text occasionally modifies the term with the adjectives "competent" or "relevant" suggesting subsets
of the broader category of "non-governmental organizations."
148, Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to Environment, 28 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 103, 104-11, (1991); Neil A. F. Popovic, The Right to Participate in Decisions that Affect the
Environment, 10 PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 683, (1993). Popovic asserts that, at a minimum, the right to
participate in environmental decision-making must consist of the following elements: 1) education about
the environment and things that might affect it; 2) access to information (including the fact that information
exists and is available); 3) a voice in decision-making; 4) transparency of decision-making processes (by
formal consideration of public input and explanation of how that input affected the decision at issue; 5) post-
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The most conservative form of this interpretation would hold that the
scope of the right as defined in the Convention would extend to participating
in "policy-planning, decision-making, and implementation and review of
national action programmes" as established in Article 10(2)(3). This
interpretation suggests that the right rests not only in non-governmental
organizations but also in the other key stakeholders identified in Article
10(2)(3). A more expansive interpretation, drawing on the other articles
referring to NGOs, states that NGOs have not only the right of participation
but also the right to be consulted on desertification policy. Recognizing
NGOs' rights to participate and to be consulted--rather than merely
acknowledging that participation of and consultation with NGOs is good
policy-is necessary to the full realization of the international strategy for
addressing desertification. Implied in the international consenus that NGOs
must play a key role in combatting desertification is a recognition that non-
democratic states that marginalize citizen groups must change their policies.
A problem with any interpretation of the scope of this right, however, is the
lack of any definition of "non-governmental organization" in the text, or a
definition that is generally accepted in international law.
5. The "Bottom-Up" Approach: Financial Mechanisms
The bottom-up process envisions that efforts to combat desertification will
originate at the local level. Therefore, financial resources, including those
from bilateral and multilateral sources, must be channeled effectively to local
actors. In particular, the scores of NGOs in developing countries that have
demonstrated significant experience with undertaking local level projects and
have effective ties to rural land users should be ensured access to funds.
The Convention imposes obligations on affected developing country
Parties to work with NGOs to ensure that financial resources reach the local
level for programs and projects. The affected developing country Parties
"shall ... utilize participatory processes" that involve NGOs in raising funds,
deciding how funds should be used, and implementing funded projects. 49
This obligation to ensure local access to financial resources, however, is
not matched by a corresponding obligation on the part of developed countries.
project analysis and monitoring, as well as access to pertinent information; 6) enforcement structures; and
7) recourse to independent tribunals for redress. Id at 691.
149. DESERTIFICATION CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 21(3).
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Donors are not obligated to channel their aid to local groups or to some kind
of financial mechanism that can achieve that aim. The paragraph on the
participatory processes merely points out that "these actions" can be enhanced
by "improved coordination and flexible programming on the part of those
providing assistance."'' °
6. The "Bottom-Up" Approach: Special Problems of Achieving
Compliance
Traditionally, international law is the law of states. 5 ' Only states can be
parties to cases heard by the International Court of Justice.'52 Only states and
international organizations can be parties to treaties.' In a system without
centralized sanctions, the willingness of a state to comply with treaty
obligations is, to a large extent, a function of its perceptions of the
consequences of non-compliance on its relations with other states.'54
The Desertification Convention essentially develops a compact among
states and non-state actors. For its success, the bottom-up process established
in the Convention depends on the compliance of the state parties with
obligations to cooperate with and empower non-state actors. This compliance
is by no means ensured by the current political atmosphere. Though the final
text reflects the general support for the bottom-up process by affected country
150. Id
151. Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, 216 REc. DES. CouRs 22
(I 989-IV) partially reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 140, at 1-2. ("The purposes of international law,
like those of domestic law, are to establish and maintain order and enhance reliable expectations, to protect
'persons', their property and other interests, to further other values. But the constituency of the international
society is different. The 'persons' constituting international society are not individual human beings but
political entities, 'States', and the society is an inter-State system, a system of States.")
152. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1179, art. 34(1)
reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., BASIc DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS 127 (1993).
153. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 595-96, at 1217-20 (Jennings & Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992),
reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 140, at 431-32.
154. OLIVER J. LISSrrzYN, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 5-6 (1951), cited in HENKIN ET
AL, supra note 140, at 31. ("In the absence of organized authority superior to the independent state, the
principal sanctions of international law, aside from the unilateral use of force the effectiveness of which
depends on the power relationship between the contestants, are the disadvantages incurred by its breach,
including the termination of the relations regulated by it and retaliation. Rational appreciation of the
advantages of a relationship acts as a restraint upon the temptations to disregard the standards governing the
relationship.")
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Parties, many opposed various provisions. 5  Indeed, a survey of the
governments of affected countries suggests that, currently, the correlation of
desertification and non-democratic systems of government is strong.
Because the Desertification Convention develops a new kind of
partnership between state and non-state actors, it would be served by
something other than the traditional state-centric enforcement mechanisms.
In its current form, the dispute mechanism established in Article 28 is available
for states only. It would be more consistent with the bottom-up process if
NGOs--whose ability to represent non-state actors is generally acknowledged
in the international community-could have access to a dispute mechanism
established by the Conference of the Parties. With this access, NGOs could
confront, in an international forum, state Parties that are systematically failing
to meet obligations of the bottom-up process. As a lesser alternative, state
parties should have obligations, similar to those established by human rights
agreements, to make reports to the Conference of the Parties on their
fulfillment of obligations of the bottom-up process.
V. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL FUNDS: INNOVATIVE FINANCIAL
MECHANISMS FOR THE "BoTroM-UP" APPROACH
As noted above, the Parties have invited the COP to consider the
establishment of national desertification funds as special financial
mechanisms. The inspiration for these mechanisms are the "national
environmental funds" (NEFs) emerging in an increasing number of developing
countries.5 6  National environmental funds have demonstrated significant
155. The first draft of the African Annex by the Organization for African Unity mentioned local
participation only in implementing action programmes rather than in both planning and implementation.
NGOs Raise Questions on OAU Text, Eco No. 1, Sept. 26, 1993, available in ECONET conference:
inc.desert, Topic No. 79. China opposed reference to partnerships with NGOs in the article on capacity
building, education, and public awareness (Art. 21). Johannah Bernstein et al., Daily Report on the INCfor
the Elaboration of an International Convention on Desertification, 4 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL., No. 29,
(Int'l Inst. For Sustainable Dev. Winnipeg, Manitoba, CA), Jan. 24, 1994. Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico
effectively blocked provisions in the first draft of the Latin American Annex for local and NGO participation
in action programmes. Brazil and China also resisted paragraph (d) of the article on "principles" which says
that the Parties "should ensure" that the design and implementation of programmes are taken with the
participation of NGOs. In the end, each of these blocking efforts was unsuccessful. Negotiations Revert
to Form, Eco No. 8, supra note 109.
156. See generally Kyle W. Danish, The Promise of National Environmental Funds in Developing
Countries, 7 INT'L ENVrL. AFF. 150 (1995). Different names exist for the group of mechanisms described
below. "National environmental fund" is the name used by the Interagency Group for Environmental Funds,
a roundtable of representatives from the GEF, official development agencies, NGOs, foundations, and from
the funds themselves. Some observers refer to the mechanisms as "environmental trust funds." However,
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promise as financial mechanisms that can complement participatory, bottom-
up approaches to addressing environmental problems.
Twenty national environmental funds are in various stages of design and
operation in developing countries; most were initiated after 1991.57 These
NEFs are emerging largely out of cooperative efforts among donors,
developing country governments, and NGOs. Once established, they are
independent from national governments. Though they appear in diverse forms
with various mandates, NEFs generally have three elements in common: (1)
the ability to receive money from a variety of sources; (2) management by a
democratic board consisting of a broad cross-section of stakeholders; and (3)
the ability to make appropriately-sized grants to a variety of beneficiaries for
a variety of purposes.'
Most of the existing national environmental funds take the legal form of
a Common Law trust fund.'5 9 In its simplest sense, a trust fund is a legal
arrangement by which a trustee(s) manages assets on behalf of a
beneficiary(ies). NEFs that are trust funds are "public" or "charitable" trust
funds. This is because the NEFs are established to finance projects that serve
a public purpose, and the legally-designated beneficiary is the general
public. ° In countries with legal systems other than the Common Law, NEFs
have been established either as trust funds through national legislation or in
forms that are the legal systems' approximation of a trust fund. In several
countries with Civil Law legal systems, NEFs are "foundations.''.
not all of the funds that otherwise meet the description used below are Common Law trust funds. Some are
Civil Law foundations or endowments. On the other hand, "national environmental funds" is also not a
perfect description of the group because not all serve only one nation. One of the funds is regional and other
regional funds are being discussed. Please also note: NEFs should be distinguished from the environmental
funds in some Central and Eastern European countries. These latter funds are, for the most part, entirely
managed by their governments.
157. Id. at 160.
158. INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES ET AL.,
REPORT OF THE FIRST GLOBAL FORUM ON ENVIRONMENTAL FUNDS 2 (1994) [hereinafter IUCN ET AL.].
159. Peter Sand has noted the proliferation of trust and trust-like arrangements for financing
international environmental protection: "[E]ven a cursory glance at international financial mechanism for
sustainable development shows an amazing-and clearly growing-variety of legal instruments that either
call themselves trusts (regardless of what they really are) or could be categorized as trusts (regardless of
what they really call themselves.)" Peter H. Sand, Trusts for the Earth: New International Financial
Mechanisms for Sustainable Development, SYMPOSIUM ON SUSTAINABLE DEV. AND INT'L L., BADEN BEI
WIEN, April 14-16, 1994.
160. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1512 (6th ed. 1990).
161. Examples of NEFs that are foundations include Honduras' National Environmental Protection
Fund and the Foundation for the Philippine Environment. THE WORLD BANK, ISSUES AND OPTIONS IN THE
DESIGN OF GEF-SUPPORTED TRUST FUNDS FOR BIODIVERSrTY CONSERVATION 86, 89 (1994) [hereinafter
THE WORLD BANK, ISSUES AND OPTIONS]. See also William F. Frachter, INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMP.
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The most innovative feature of national environmental funds is their
boards of directors or trustees. These boards are broadly representative and
have principal authority for deciding how funds should be spent. Boards
typically include representatives from national and local environmental NGOs,
government officials, and technical experts. Some boards include
representatives of bilateral or multilateral donors. International environmental
NGOs are represented as voting or ex-officio members of several NEF boards.
Most of the boards grant majority voting power to non-governmental
representatives from the host country.'62
Many NEFs are perpetual endowments. Money they receive is invested
as principal and they make disbursements from the annual net interest income.
Other NEFs more closely approximate revolving funds, disbursing money
received in the same or next year. 63
National environmental funds can receive financial resources from a
variety of sources. A range of official development agencies, international
environmental NGOs, and foundations have made grants to national
environmental funds. National environmental funds have also received funds
through debt-for-nature swaps." Some emerging NEFs will tap internal
sources of funds such as revenues from taxes on domestic extractive industries
and fees charged to tourists. 6 The Global Environment Facility is providing
L., 104 (1972).
162. NEFs in many countries are making use of supplementary local or regional advisory boards in
order to further maximize local participation in decision-making and implementation. The Indonesian
Biodiversity Foundation, for example, will have several regional advisory boards with representatives from
its remote island regions-the sources of its vast biological richness. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEv., USAID
PARALLEL-FINANCED PROJECTS IN THE PILOT 'PHASE OF THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY 10 (1995).
Similarly, the board of Uganda's Mgahinga and Bwindi Impenetrable Forest Conservation Trust (MBFICT)
designed to finance conservation efforts in two national forests will have the support of a Local Community
Steering Committee. The Committee will consist of forest residents, wardens-in-charge, and the field staff
of NGOs active in the area. The Committee will solicit and screen community development grants and have
the authority to approve grants of up to $1,000. In addition, the Committee will select three residents who
will serve as voting members of the MBFICT board. THE WORLD BANK, ISSUES AND OPTIONS, supra note
161, at 29.
163. THE WORLD BANK, ISSUES AND OPTIONS, supra note 161, at 102.
164. The United States Agency for International Development has funneled a total of $154 million
into 7 Latin American NEFs through debt-for-nature swaps. IUCN, ET AL, supra note 158, at 2. In a debt-
for-nature swap, one party purchases or forgives the debt of debtor country in exchange for the debtor
country's commitment of funds to an environmental purpose(s). See Derek Asiedu-Akrofi, Debt-for-Nature
Swaps: Extending the Frontiers of Innovative Financing in Support of the Global Environment, 25 INT'L
L. 557, 564 (1991).
165. See e.g., WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, PAPUA NEW GUINEA TRUST FUND (1993) (fund organizers are
considering levy on mining and petroleum industries); WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, BELIZE: PROTECTED AREAS
CONSERVATION TRUST (1993) (fund organizers are considering an $8 "conservation fee" to be charged to
tourists.)
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support to eleven national environmental funds through its Biodiversity
Portfolio." GEF officials expect that the Facility will provide increased
support to national environmental funds in the future.'67
The utilization by affected country Parties of national desertification funds
would help them fulfill several obligations in the Convention. National
desertification funds could serve the function of both "national coordinating
mechanisms" for efficient use of resources, and "participatory processes" that
involve NGOs in planning and implementation. 6  Similarly, national
desertification funds could fulfill the role of the "operational mechanisms"
envisioned by the article on coordination." 9  Fund boards could include
representatives from developed country governments, affected country
governments, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs. 7°
The funds could also ensure efficient use of financial resources by creating
tight links between external aid and needs identified in national action
programmes. The legal instruments establishing individual national
desertification funds could obligate the fund boards to make disbursements
from the fund in accordance with national action programme processes.
Additionally, national desertification funds could be a source of long-term
financing for the long-term needs of a national action programme. Even if
donors maintain their preference for uncoordinated short-term grants, national
desertification funds could accept such grants and transform them into
disbursements for several years worth of projects or yearly disbursements for
long-term projects that require recurrent support. National desertification
funds established as perpetual endowments could accept financial transfers,
invest them, and use the interest as an annual budget to support national action
programmes. The ability of national environmental funds to finance programs
over the long-term has been lauded by the Global Environment Facility.171
166. THE WORLD BANK, FINANCING INNOVATION AND INSTRUMENTS: CONTRIBUTION OF THE
INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO OF THE PILOT PHASE OF THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY 2 (1994). The GEF
has contributed directly to the principal of 5 NEFs and financed technical assistance for another 6.
167. Id.
168. A New Idea for Coordinating Desertification Programmes, Eco No. 9, Jan. 27, 1994, available
in Econet conference: inc.desert, topic No. 152.
169. DESERTIFICATION CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 14(2).
170. The board of Bhutan's Trust Fund for Conservation, for example, includes two members from
the national government, one member representing local NGOs, a representative from the World Wildlife
Fund, and a representative of the United Nations Development Programme. Danish, supra note 155, at 158.
171. THE WORLD BANK, ISSUES AND OPTIONS, supra note 160, at 7. ("Conservation trust funds have
increasing appeal because of their obvious potential to stabilize the flow of resources to meet the recurrent
costs of conservation initiatives over the long term.")
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National desertification funds could also enhance the transparency and
accountability of the aid process.' Boards could make disbursement
decisions in open meetings according to agreed-upon and well-publicized
criteria. The decision-making process would benefit from a creative tension
among board members who may have different interests. With such broad
representation, it would be almost impossible for the fund to become the
private fiefdom of any party. Moreover, board positions for different groups
could rotate so that no one NGO or government ministry would be entrenched
as both a voting member and leading recipient of funds. Accountability could
be ensured by subjecting national desertification funds to audits.73
Despite these clear benefits of national desertification funds as financial
mechanisms, they are not a panacea. Experience with national environmental
funds has shown that establishing such funds involves significant transaction
costs and technical complexity. National environmental fund organizers
typically have retained a battery of accountants and lawyers. It is likely that
affected developing countries would need significant technical and financial
assistance to make national desertification funds operational.'7
These obstacles notwithstanding, national environmental funds hold
significant promise as financial mechanisms to support international efforts to
combat desertification. Given this promise, how should the Desertification
Convention incorporate national desertification funds? The COP should create
a protocol or amendment requiring the Parties to undertake the process of
developing national desertification funds in the affected African countries.
The process should involve the same scope of participation as that of the
national action programme process. Developed countries should have
obligations to support this process.
The contents of any protocol or amendment establishing national
desertification funds as a favored financial mechanism should not impose too
many uniform obligations on the funds; the national environmental fund
172. Thus they could contribute to the "qualitative improvement of all national, bilateral, and
multilateral funding sources and mechanisms" which the Parties have indicated that they "shall seek".
DESERTIFICATION CONVENTION, supra note 1, at art. 20(4).
173. See Danish, supra note 156 (giving examples of means by which national environmental funds
can enhance the contractual environment between donors and recipients).
174. Those funds that operate as perpetual endowments are especially costly to develop and
administer. The GEF recommends that national environmental funds that are perpetual endowments should
establish a principal of at least $5-10 million in order to generate an adequate budget from annual interest.
In countries with urgent financing needs, tying up such large amounts of capital for small annual returns
would be highly inefficient. Such countries should develop mechanisms closer in form to a revolving fund
so that resources are available as needed. Id at 168.
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experience has demonstrated that one size does not fit all. Depending on the
legal system in a particular country, a national desertification fund might take
the form of a foundation rather than a trust fund. Depending on the stability
of the national currency and risks of attachment, a fund may need to house its
assets in another country. Depending on the amount of financial resources
available and the urgency of needs, a fund may be more effective in the form
of a revolving fund rather than a perpetual endowment.
This necessary heterogeneity notwithstanding, an amendment or protocol
should require certain common features for national desertification funds:
* Each fund board should have authority independent of the national
government over spending decisions; however, a national government may
require that it have representatives on the fund board.
* Each fund board should "effectively" represent NGOs, women, and a
broad cross-section of land users generally.
* Board operations should be transparent and accountable. Meetings should
be open to the public. Decision-making should be democratic and in
accordance with well-publicized criteria. The funds should be subject to audits
by external bodies that the COP or the Secretariat would identify.
* Even if they will not accept obligations to direct new and additional
resources to national desertification funds, developed country Parties should
have obligations to channel substantial or significant resources into the funds
or, at the least, to co-finance fund supported projects. Without such
corresponding obligations for developed country Parties, affected country
Parties merely will waste scarce financial resources on the administrative costs
of creating and operating national desertification funds into which no money
is deposited.
VI. CONCLUSION: A PROMISING NEW APPROACH FOR CONFRONTING
PROBLEMS OF HARMFUl, PATTERNS OF LAND USE
After nearly two decades of political failure, the international community
has launched an innovative and promising new initiative to reverse and prevent
the mismanagement of the world's drylands. Where the Plan of Action to
Combat Desertification ignored the complex interplay of socio-economic
influences behind dryland over-exploitation, the Desertification Convention
confronts them directly. The Convention suggests a new holistic and
participatory approach that aims to make development of drylands sustainable.
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The Convention is not perfect, yet some of its failings can only be
expected in the current international political and economic climate. Given
worldwide donor fatigue, it should not be surprising that rich countries did not
accept a binding pledge to increase official development assistance or commit
to transfer to affected countries new and additional funds for desertification
initiatives.'75 Additionally, though certain patterns of international trade have
been linked to desertification, developed countries predictably hesitated to re-
open the battle scars of trade debates within the context of a convention that
merely addresses a single international environmental problem.'76 The
international-level macro conditions of inadequate aid and predatory trade are
merely referenced in the text of the Desertification Convention. It is unlikely
that they will be confronted within future protocols. Regarding the national-
level macro conditions, the African Annex, at least, includes commitments by
the affected countries to reform land tenure with the aim of making land
ownership more secure and equitable.
These failures notwithstanding, the Desertification Convention achieves
important and promising successes. It has heightened concern about the
problem of desertification worldwide. Importantly, the increased awareness
of the problem of desertification is also a more enlightened awareness; the
Convention gave the international community an opportunity to articulate a
clearer identification of the problem.
With a better understanding of the problem of desertification, the Parties
have conceived a better approach to addressing it-the bottom-up approach.
The bottom-up approach, as developed in the Convention, obligates the Parties
to consult with and increase the capacity and welfare of rural people. The
bottom-up approach also consists of mechanisms that facilitate the
implementation of these obligations.
175. Another reason for the reluctance of rich countries to commit to providing affected developing
countries with new and additional money for desertification programs is that, unlike climate change,
biodiversity loss, ozone depletion and other international environmental problems, desertification in the third
world does not directly harm those in the first world.
176. Unquestionably, national trade policies have significant impacts on the use and abuse of natural
resources. The world's major economic powers, however, are hesitant to address these links in the context
of international environmental agreements. They do not desire to create binding obligations to reform beef
subsidies within an international treaty on desertification. This political failure has provoked scholars and
policy-makers to suggest the need for a new kind of international institution which can address these links
in a comprehensive fashion. See Jeffrey Dunoff, From Green to Global: Toward the Transformation of
International Environmental Law, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 241 (1995); DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE
GArr: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE (1994).
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The core of the bottom-up approach is a leading role for rural land users
and NGOs in the planning, evaluation, and implementation of comprehensive
national action programmes. The Parties have obligations to cooperate and
consult with NGOs in a variety of policy responses. As a result of the
Desertification Convention, NGOs have an unprecedented degree of
international legal identity, and important recognition of their technical
environmental expertise and ability to work with rural communities.
The new mechanisms developed by the Convention and envisioned for
later protocols are important additions to the institutions of international
environmental law. The Global Mechanism is likely to serve functions of
identifying financial needs and sources that could fill those needs. Operational
mechanisms and national coordinating mechanisms in each of the affected
countries will bring together representatives from donor institutions and donor
countries with representatives from affected regions to ensure that resources
are channeled to where they are most required. The Conference of the Parties
will give greater definition to some of these mechanisms.
The Parties should adopt and endorse a kind of mechanism already in use
in many countries of the developing world--the national environmental fund.
NEFs in the form of national desertification funds would serve the functions
of coordination, increased participation, and financial efficiency which are the
clearly-expressed goals for the various mechanisms envisioned by Convention.
However, national desertification funds or any kind of new bottom-up
financial mechanisms will only be effective if donor countries and affected
countries commit to channeling financial resources through them.
The new kinds of obligations and mechanisms that constitute the
Desertification Convention's bottom-up approach are a valuable contribution
to the progressive development of international environmental law. If the
international community is to address harms to human and environmental
health from improper rural resource management, it will need to adopt the
international law of the bottom-up approach.
Harms caused by unsustainable land use lurk behind international
environmental problems to which the international community is just
beginning to turn its attention. Prior to 1992, international environmental law,
even with its dynamic development, had not confronted this kind of problem.
The most prominent agreements in international environmental law before
UNCED addressed highly-organized economic activities. The conventions
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on transboundary air pollution'77 and ozone depletion, 7 for example, have as
their subject environmental damage resulting from industrial activities.
Another principal agreement endeavors to limit the exploitation of endangered
species occurring through international trade. 79 Among the elements these
agreements have in common is their focus on markets and actors-industrial
operations and international trade--that are traditionally subject to government
regulation.
A set of principles, approaches, and institutions of international
environmental law have formed around these pre-1992 agreements. In the
agreements on transboundary air pollution and ozone depletion, states have
agreed to certain, largely uniform targets for the reduction of emissions and
timetables for achieving those reductions. In the agreement on trade in
endangered species, the states have agreed to a regime of trade restrictions.
The ozone depletion convention has elements of both a targets-and-timetables
regime and a trade regime. These agreements have consisted largely of efforts
to collectively codify government regulations.
The UNCED agreements address, in part, harms caused not only by actors
traditionally regulated by governments but also by traditionally unregulated
actors. These actors, as in the case of desertification, are rural, mostly poor
people induced by a variety of conditions to over-exploit important resources.
In the long run, reductions in greenhouse gases will not only require limiting
emissions by factories but also those by cattle farmers and rice growers.
Similarly, the Biodiversity Convention acknowledges that species are not only
threatened by trade but also by the encroachment of cultivators upon habitats.
The process of tropical desertification is strikingly similar to that of
desertification. In the 1980s, the principal agents of deforestation were loggers
encouraged by government subsidies to extend their operations into tropical
forests. Today, some scholars believe that the agent of an equal or greater
percentage of tropical deforestation is the poor, slash-and-burn farmer. These
farmers are being induced into migrating into the forests by population growth,
177. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP), done Nov. 13, 1979, 34
U.S.T. 3043, 1302 U.N.T.S. 217. See also Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary
Air Pollution; on Financing the Monitoring and Evaluation of Air Pollutants in Europe, done Sept. 28, 1984,
24 1.L.M. 484.
178. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (with Annexes I & I1), done Mar. 22,
1985, 26 I.L.M. 1529. See also Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, done Sept. 16, 1987,
26 I.L.M. 1541.
179. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna, opened for
signature Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
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inequitable and insecure land tenure, and national policies that favor urban
areas.
°80
To date, none of the other UNCED regimes has adopted the elements of
the bottom-up approach initiated in the Desertification Convention.' That is
not to say that the bottom-up approach is not everywhere in evidence in
governmental and non-governmental efforts to reduce non-industrial
greenhouse gas emissions, preserve species, and protect forests. International
environmental law must give definition to the bottom-up approach in these
other contexts. Many national governments, jealously guarding access to
power and resources, will not work with NGOs, refuse to make rural
development participatory, and do not recognize national environmental funds
as legitimate mechanisms. The new international environmental law of the
bottom-up approach, as articulated in the Desertification Convention, therefore
deserves further development both in the Desertification Convention and other
emerging UNCED regimes.
180. See generally Norman Myers, The Anatomy of Environmental Action: the Case of Tropical
Deforestation, in INT'L POLMcs OF THE ENV'T 430 (Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury eds., 1992).
Myers asserts that, in the 1980s "shifted cultivators" surpassed commercial logging and ranching enterprises
as the principal agents of tropical deforestation. Id at 432. Myers' "shifted cultivators" are poor slash-and-
bum farmers forced out of traditional farmlands. Myers cites several factors for their migration, all of which
are familiar from an analysis of the causes of desertification: rapid population growth which causes
competition for land; inattention of national governments to rural development needs; and urban bias in
agricultural price policies. Id at 444-45. Myers also cites inequitable land tenure as an important factor; in
Brazil, which contains a third of the world's tropical forests, 5% of the population controls 70% of the
country's arable land. Id. at 445.
181. The Framework Convention on Climate Change contains no articles that include elements of the
bottom-up approach. In the Forestry Principles text, only one paragraph mentions NGOs. Forestry
Principles, supra note 2, art. 2(d). Though the Forestry Principles text mentions the importance of local
participation, it merely states that governments "should promote and provide opportunities" for such
participation. Id art. 2(d). The Biodiversity Convention also does not develop a bottom-up approach in its
text. It includes only 6 paragraphs that mention local people, NGOs, or women. Biodiversity Convention,
supra note 2, pmbl., paras. 12, 13, 14; arts. 8(j), 10(c), and 10(d). Only one paragraph mentions NGOs. Id.
pmbl, para. 14. The Biodiversity Convention includes an article on "in-situ conservation" which is defined
as conservation of ecosystems and species in their natural surroundings. Id. art. 2. Optimally, governments
should be compelled to provide for the effective participation of local people and NGOs in in-situ
conservation, yet the relevant articles contain no such obligations.
